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8 April 1966

AN APPRAISAL OF CHINESE COMMUNIST STRATEGY TOWARD INDIA AND PAKISTAN

By

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An Appraisal of Chinese Communist Strategy
Toward India and Pakistan

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8 April 1966

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
SUMMARY	iii
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. INDIA: ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES	3
Economic background	3
Economic problems	4
Political background	5
Domestic political problem	7
International political problems	8
Social background	9
Social problems	11
Military background	12
Military problems	15
3. PAKISTAN: ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES	17
Economic background	17
Economic problems	19
Political background	20
Political problems	21
Social background	23
Social problems	25
Military background	26
Military problems	28
4. SIGNIFICANT TRENDS IN ACTIONS BY COMMUNIST	
CHINA IN SOUTHERN ASIA	29
Factors influencing Communist China's actions	29
Peking changes its foreign policy	34
Peking makes new friends in Southern Asia	36
5. OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMMUNIST CHINA	43
India	43
Pakistan	46
6. CONCLUSIONS	49
Apparent objectives of Communist China toward	
India	49
Apparent strategy of Communist China toward	
India	49
Apparent objectives of Communist China toward	
Pakistan	50
Apparent strategy of Communist China toward	
Pakistan	50
BIBLIOGRAPHY	52

SUMMARY

India and Pakistan have the potential to become great powers. But, at the present time, their survival is threatened from within as well as from without. They are fighting a continuing battle against poverty, illiteracy, population pressures, communalism, casteism, linguistic and regional rivalries. Low productivity of agriculture and a shortage of foreign exchange constitute the chief economic bottlenecks in both countries. It is generally agreed that, if India and Pakistan are to develop, they must receive massive foreign aid until their economies reach the point of self-sustaining growth.

The development of India and Pakistan is of extreme importance to the West for two major reasons. First, these countries offer other nations of the world a democratic model for development. Secondly, they provide a nucleus for a friendly power block in Southern Asia capable of checking Red China's expansion in Asia.

Communist China is also struggling to develop. Its avowed aims are to build a powerful Communist state, achieve hegemony in Asia and reach the status of a great world power. One of the basic assumptions of current Communist Chinese foreign policy is total and unrelenting hostility toward the West and the United States in particular.

Peking appreciates the power potential of Pakistan and India. In particular, it considers India a competitor in the struggle for leadership in Asia and the nonaligned world. Although, at the present time, Peking's strategy toward Pakistan and India appears to be different, there are indications that Communist China's long range objective toward these countries is identical.

Peking is determined to bring India and Pakistan within its sphere of influence. Failing in this goal, Communist China will exert every effort to prevent them from developing into strong and viable democracies.

This paper discusses the strengths and weaknesses of Pakistan and India; identifies significant trends in actions of Red China in Southern Asia, and analyzes these actions in light of Peking's opportunities in India and Pakistan. Finally, the paper suggests possible objectives and strategy of Communist China toward India and Pakistan.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

All eyes are focused on efforts of the nations of Southern Asia to become modern and self-sufficient. Excluding the Sino-Soviet regions, more than one billion people inhabit a land area more than four times the size of the United States. And, as a region rich in natural resources, the economic potential of Southern Asia is vast.

Although the economic stake is important, the paramount stake of the West in Southern Asia is a political one. The central problem is political conflict with Communist China. The survival of the political and economic systems of the West may well depend on the outcome of this struggle.

India and Pakistan are keys to the political struggle in Southern Asia between the West and Communist China. India, with its vast population, rich natural resources, and strategic location on the sub-continent of Asia is a potential leader of the nations in Southern Asia. If the development plans of Pakistan and India are reasonably successful, there is a good chance that they will remain outside Communist China's sphere of influence. The success of their development programs is largely dependent upon foreign aid until their economies reach a point of self-sustaining growth. During Pakistan's and India's early stages of development, it is most important that aid programs sponsored by the West be continued.

It is generally accepted that one of Communist China's national goals is to extend Chinese hegemony throughout the Far East. Although this goal may be identified, the important "how" the goal is to be attained is not known. Because of the important influence that India and Pakistan will have on the outcome of the struggle between Communist China and the West, it is important that Red China's strategy toward these countries be identified.

It is the purpose of this paper to attempt to identify Communist China's strategy toward India and Pakistan.

CHAPTER 2

INDIA: ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Economic Potential. Potentially, India is one of the industrial giants of the modern world. It has immense resources in manpower, coal and hydroelectric-power potential, industrial raw materials, and rich agricultural land. These resources have not been extensively tapped. Although India has made some progress in the economic field, it remains one of the poorest and most underdeveloped nations in the world. Its national income is about 1/16 of the United States for a population that is about two and one-half times as large. This means that the average annual per capita income is about \$70 compared to \$2,600 in the United States.¹

The Five-Year Plans. Shortly after independence the government under Nehru adopted a socialist economy as a national objective. India has followed an economic policy aimed at rapid economic development through planned industrialization and increasing government participation in, and control of, the basic economic processes. The economic programs are being carried out through a series of Five-Year Plans.

¹Max F. Millikan, "The Economic Future of India: Hazards and Promises," Asia, Autumn 1964, p. 57.

The First Five-Year Plan was launched in April 1951 and emphasized the development of agriculture, irrigation, power, and transport.²

The Second Five-Year Plan, starting in April 1957, was designed to develop basic and heavy industries and to continue the socioeconomic policies initiated under the First Plan.³

The Third Five-Year Plan, starting in April 1961, was designed to overcome the shortfalls of the first two Five-Year Plans.⁴

As the Third Five-Year Plan draws to a close and the finishing touches are being put on the Fourth Five-Year Plan, many Americans and Indians are concerned about economic progress in India. Most authorities agree that the First Five-Year Plan was successful. The Second and Third Five-Year Plans fell short of the announced goals. Although industrial output doubled and steel output trebled during the three Five-Year Plan periods, the harsh fact remains that the per capita income has failed to climb appreciably.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Although many factors contributed to India's failure to reach economic goals set forth in the Third Five-Year Plan, the key

²American University, Special Operations Research Office, U.S. Army Area Handbook for India, p. 545 (referred to hereafter as "American University, Handbook India").

³Ibid., p. 546.

⁴Ibid., p. 553.

factors were the foreign exchange bottleneck, and the agricultural bottleneck.⁵

The problem confronting India in the foreign exchange area is how to cover the present \$1 billion a year balance of payments deficit and a future deficit which will probably grow larger with a successful development program.⁶

Agriculture, which constitutes nearly half of the total output of the Indian economy, has been essentially stagnant since 1960-61. With unfavorable monsoon rains this year, prospects look even darker for the coming year. The general pattern of agriculture is of small, fragmented farms, often consisting of not more than 1 or 2 acres, and rarely more than 20 acres. Most of the food produced on these small farms is consumed by the farmer and his family. Agricultural yields are among the lowest in the world.

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

One of India's greatest strengths is its democratic form of government. By terms of its constitution, India is a secular, federal republic with a parliamentary, democratic form of government in which sovereignty rests with the people.⁷ The Indian government is patterned largely after British, and to a lesser degree American, patterns. It is divided into three distinct but

⁵Millikan, op. cit., p. 54.

⁶Ibid., p. 61.

⁷American University, Handbook India, p. 353.

not entirely separate branches: the executive, legislative, and judicial.

The Executive Branch. The executive branch is headed by the President and a Council of Ministers. The President is head of the Union and Supreme Commander of the Defense Forces and is vested with a wide range of powers. The Council of Ministers, which wields the actual executive authority, is appointed by the president, usually from among the elected members of Parliament. The Council is collectively responsible to Parliament. It is headed by a Prime Minister who functions through a Cabinet which forms the inner circle within the Council of Ministers. The Cabinet is the highest policymaking body and the supreme organ of coordination in the government.

The Legislative Branch. There is no strict separation of the executive and legislative powers in the Indian parliamentary form of government. The power of the Parliament is limited by division of powers between the union and the states, and by the fundamental rights of the citizens which are guaranteed against legislative encroachment. Parliament is composed of two houses, the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. The Lok Sabha is elected directly by the people whereas members of the Rajya Sabha are elected by the state assemblies.

The Judicial Branch. The judicial system had its beginning under the British and, therefore, the body of prevailing legal conceptions and procedures closely resemble those of Anglo-Saxon

countries.⁸ The independence of the judiciary is guaranteed in the Constitution and is strengthened by the existence of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court exercises broad powers of judicial review and acts as guarantor of the fundamental rights of the citizen. Each state has a high court and, for the purposes of judicial administration, each state is divided into a number of districts. There are many judicial authorities of different grades below the level of district court.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS

India has had a remarkably stable government during its formative years. Many western observers attribute this stability to the western-oriented intellectuals who led India to independence and developed its political institutions. These same observers fear that, with the passing of western-oriented intellectuals from the political scene, Indian political stability will end.

Separatist Movements. For a time, after achieving its freedom, Indian territorial unity was threatened by a movement for linguistic states. This movement resulted in the reorganization of several states along linguistic lines.⁹ Subsequently, there has been an absence of any major threats to India's territorial unity. There are separatist movements in Madras, Punjab, and the Naga

⁸Ibid., pp. 373-374.

⁹Myron Weiner, "Whither India? Unity and Diversity," Asia, pp. 2-3.

Hills area, but India has demonstrated an ability to control these movements.¹⁰

Growing Dissension in India. One can observe in contemporary Indian politics an extraordinary number of internal conflicts which suggest that linguistic, religious, caste, and tribal loyalties are deeply rooted in Indian life. Several states have passed legislation restricting activities of individuals from other linguistic regions, thereby inhibiting the movement of labor and capital across state boundaries.¹¹ Some universities have adopted a regional language as the medium of instruction.¹² This practice inhibits the movement of students and faculty from one part of the country to another. And there is a growing tendency to use democracy as a scapegoat for India's economic failures.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS

Dominant Themes in Foreign Relations. Beginning in 1928 and continuing until his death, Nehru almost single-handedly guided the foreign policies of India. The dominant themes in India's foreign relations have been the preservation of world peace and nonalignment. Prime Minister Nehru, in 1963, reaffirmed the correctness of these themes as the most effective means of securing military and economic assistance from foreign powers.¹³

¹⁰Ibid., p. 5.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., p. 6.

¹³American University, Handbook India, p. 469.

International Political Problems. It is generally accepted that India's most pressing international political problems are securing foreign aid and the maintenance of peace on its borders.

India has been quite successful in obtaining massive foreign aid. The United States, which is the largest single source of foreign aid, as of late 1963 had authorized over \$5 billion dollars in grants and loans--those made since 1961 have been interest free.¹⁴

The Indian government has been devoting an increasing effort towards improving relations with its neighbors. At the present time, except for Pakistan and Communist China, India is on friendly terms with other Asian nations. Pakistan and Red China present major stumbling blocks to India's development. As a result of the border problems with Communist China and the dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir, India has created an Army in excess of 800,000 men, and has trebled its defense budget.¹⁵ It plans to spend \$10 billion on defense alone over the next five years, which is adding fuel to the frightening inflation.¹⁶

SOCIAL BACKGROUND

Cultural Characteristics. With a population of over 472 million, India is the second most populous country in the world,

¹⁴Ibid., p. 681.

¹⁵Stephen Hugh-Jones, "India's New Military Strength," The New Republic, Vol. 151, 19 Dec. 1964, p. 11.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 12.

exceeded only by Communist China. The population is characterized by extreme cultural diversity.

The very essence of India is her villages. More than 82 percent of the population is found in some 550,000 villages.¹⁷ In a sense, almost every Indian whether he lives in Calcutta or Bombay is a villager at heart. The average villager is poverty stricken, undernourished and uneducated. As Gandhi often pointed out, India lives in its villages and unless village life can be revitalized, the nation as a whole can hardly come alive.¹⁸

The cultural base of India is formed by Hindu religion, caste, and the joint family, all of which tend to be mutually supporting.

The Hindu Religion. The Hindu approach to life places obstacles in the path of development. The Hindu concept of cyclical time and the concept of birth, death, and rebirth causes the Hindu to be willing to accept the role in life acquired at birth. Many consequences flow from this phenomenon of "limited aspirations." Unless the individual feels the desire to have more material wealth, sufficiently to strive for it, he cannot be expected to have much interest in new techniques.

The Caste. The prevailing structure of power, property, influence, and status in rural India is based on caste; therefore, the unit of action and source of aspiration is the group--not the individual. The group is represented by the extended family and

¹⁷Beatrice P. Lamb, India: A World in Transition, p. 252.

¹⁸Norman Dunbar Palmer, The Indian Political System, p. 149.

the caste. Unless a change introduced by the government fits into the group pattern of life, it is often rejected outright. Many other changes, if accepted by the group, are modified so that they bear little resemblance to the change originally introduced.

The Joint Family. The joint family perpetuates social diversity and poverty in village India. Family interests take precedence over community interests. Economic necessity requires family solidarity, while lack of opportunity to branch away from the family limits economic opportunity, and perpetuates economic need.

SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Social Development Programs. Among India's most serious social problems are cultural diversity, and the lack of economic development in village India. The government has sought to develop a sense of national unity by discouraging interests of diverse religious, linguistic and cultural communities. In furtherance of the drive for national unity, and to improve economic conditions in the countryside, two ambitious and interrelated programs were launched in 1952. These two programs, the National Extension Service and the Community Development Plan, are being implemented through the Five-Year Plans. Both programs have as their unit of operation a "development block" containing on an average, about 100 villages with a population of 60 to 70 thousand persons spread over an area of 150 to 170 square miles.¹⁹ At the village level,

¹⁹American University, Handbook India, p. 218.

the programs are carried out through panchayats (village councils); the cooperative, the school, and the village level worker. In addition, there are many specialists at the "development block" level who may be called upon to assist the village worker. Although social progress is evident in India today, it is fair to say that the Development Programs have not met the expectations of the Indian Government.

MILITARY BACKGROUND

The Beginning of the Modern Indian Army. India's armed forces had their beginning in the old British Indian armed forces. When British India was divided between India and Pakistan in 1947, India received about two-thirds of the native portion of the pre-independence army and about the same proportion of the materiel and stores.²⁰

Top Control and Overall Strengths. The constitution places supreme command of the armed forces in the president. Administrative and operational control is vested in the Minister of Defense and the chiefs of staff of the army, navy and air force. The chiefs of staff are equal and independent, and are responsible for administration and operation of their respective commands.

Since its humiliating defeat by Red China, India has rapidly increased its armed forces and is becoming a major military power

²⁰Ibid., pp. 748-749.

in Asia. It is estimated that the total armed forces strength in 1964-65 was about 867,000 men.²¹

The Army. The army headquarters is located in Delhi and operates under the Chief of Staff of the Army, a four-star general. The army staff includes a: Staff Branch, Adjutant General Branch, Quartermaster General Branch, Master General of Ordnance Branch, Engineer in Chief Branch, and the Secretary Branch.

The army consists of about 825,000 regular troops plus 47,000 in the volunteer reserve Territorial Army.²² Its principle units are 16 infantry divisions, one armoured brigade, and four light tank regiments.²³

Personnel for the armed forces are recruited from every state, but the states of Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan, containing traditionally martial peoples, furnish the greatest numbers. The Sikhs and Gurkhas, for example, provide over one-fifth of the army strength.²⁴ With India's population of over 472 million, there is no shortage of manpower for the armed forces.

The Indian soldier has a reputation for being courageous and proud. He is a volunteer who has chosen the army as a career. The Indian soldier, by secular standards, enjoys considerable prestige. In addition, he is held in high esteem as a warrior.

²¹The Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1964-65, p. 31.

²²Ibid.,

²³Ibid.

²⁴American University, Handbook India, p. 751.

Traditionally, the warrior is the second highest of the four scheduled castes in the Hindu social structure.

The Navy. The Indian Navy is under the command of the Chief of Naval Staff, a vice admiral. The navy is divided into four commands under the command of a senior naval officer: Flag Officer, Commanding Indian Fleet; Flag Officer, Bombay; Commodore in Charge, Cochin; and Commodore, East Coast, Visakhapatnam.

It is estimated that the Navy's total strength is 16,000.²⁵ It has one aircraft carrier, two cruisers, three destroyers, a number of light ships and a small air arm.²⁶

The Air Force. The Chief of Air Staff commands the Indian Air Force. There are four major staff sections at Air Force Headquarters: Deputy Chief of Air Staff, Administration, Maintenance, and Policy and Plans.

The operational forces consist of the Operational Command; Training Command; Maintenance Command, and the Eastern Air Command. In addition, seven auxiliary Air Force squadrons have been created.

It is estimated that the Air Force strength is 28,000.²⁷ Its main operational forces consist of 10 fighter-bomber squadrons, eight interceptor squadrons and four bomber squadrons.²⁸ Its support squadrons include a reconnaissance squadron and an air transport force.

²⁵The Institute for Strategic Studies, op. cit., p. 31.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid.

MILITARY PROBLEMS

India's industrial base does not provide many of the major items of equipment used by its armed forces. Although substantial aid is provided by the West and the Soviet Union, it will be some time before India will be capable of manufacturing all items needed by its armed forces.

The logistical support capability of the Indian armed forces is one of its most critical problems. This weakness was particularly evident during the Sino-Indian war. India has concentrated on improving the logistical support capabilities of its armed forces since the border clash with Red China. Although considerable advances have been made, there are still critical weaknesses in the logistical support system. For example, the armed forces are still short of communications equipment and motor transport. A poor road system makes the movement of equipment and supplies by motor transport difficult.

With rapid expansion of its armed forces, India is experiencing a shortage of trained officers and non-commissioned officers. Engineering and medical officers are also in short supply.

India also has a technical training problem. Most of the recruits require costly and time consuming training before they are qualified to operate and maintain modern weapon systems.

Finally, India has a strategic planning problem to overcome. Most of its military plans are defensive in nature and oriented toward Pakistan. Broader planning, including offensive planning, is needed.

In summary, the armed forces are capable of defending India against attack from any of its immediate neighbors, but would not be able to prevent an invasion by the Chinese Communists or the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER 3

PAKISTAN: ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Economic Potential. Pakistan possesses the natural and human resources to become a great power. It has good natural ports on the Bay of Bengal at Chalna and Chittagong, and on the Arabian Sea at Karachi. Its many rivers provide water for agriculture and navigation links between major cities. Many are adaptable for construction of hydroelectric plants. It has rich soils and an abundance of rain in East Pakistan, plus a considerable irrigation potential in arid West Pakistan. Large tracts of arable land in West Pakistan have not yet been cultivated.¹ Its climate is favorable for growing food grains and fiber crops. Its rapidly growing population, in excess of 100 million, provides a potentially vast market for goods and a large labor pool.

Pakistan is handicapped by a scarcity of natural resources needed for heavy industry. Coaking coal and high grade iron ore are in short supply and only limited petroleum reserves have been found to date. Large natural gas reserves have been discovered, in recent years, in both East and West Pakistan.²

¹The U.S. Military Assistance Institute, Pakistan: Country Study and Station Report, p. 106.

²US Dept of State, Background Notes: Pakistan, Aug. 1964, p. 4.

Economic Philosophy. The government envisages a role in economic development for both its public and private sectors. The government participates and controls enterprises considered beyond the capabilities of the private sector. Free enterprise and foreign investment are encouraged.

The Five-Year Plans. Pakistan's economic program is being carried out through a series of Five-Year Plans.

The First Five-Year Plan, 1955-1960, was designed to increase national income by 15 percent, per capita income by 7 percent and production of food grains by 13 percent.³

The Second Five-Year Plan was launched on 1 July 1960. It was expected to increase national income by 24 percent, per capita income by 12 percent, food production by 21 percent, output of large-scale industry by 60 percent and foreign exchange by 15 percent.⁴

The Third Five-Year Plan calls for an expenditure of \$10 billion and will place more emphasis on development of heavy industry, power, technical training, and education.⁵

There is general agreement among authorities that, although all goals were not met, the First and Second Five-Year Plans were generally successful. For example, the average growth rate in gross national product for the period 1960-61 through 1962-63 was

³Chemical Bank New York Trust Company, International Economic Survey: Pakistan, No. 147, Mar. 1965, p. 5.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 6.

4.2 percent; in the nonagricultural sectors it was 19.2 percent and in manufacturing industries it rose to 33 percent.⁶ When the results of the Second Five-Year Plan are considered, there is room for cautious optimism regarding prospects for the Third Five-Year Plan.

In spite of the economic progress made during the First and Second Five-Year Plans, per capita income is about \$72 which is one of the lowest in the world.⁷ Poverty is widespread among the masses and there is considerable unemployment.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Agriculture. Most observers consider agriculture as the major problem area in Pakistan's economy.

Pakistan is essentially an agricultural country. Between 85 and 90 percent of the people depend upon agriculture for their livelihood and more than 95 percent of the government's foreign exchange earnings are derived from exports of agricultural products.⁸ In general, agriculture is characterized by small fragmented farms and primitive farming methods. In West Pakistan, for example, about 70 percent of the farms are less than 10 acres and in East Pakistan most farms are smaller than three acres.⁹

⁶US Dept of State, op. cit., p. 5.

⁷Ibid., p. 4.

⁸The U.S. Military Assistance Institute, op. cit., p. 105.

⁹Chemical Bank New York Trust Company, op. cit., p. 7.

Each section of Pakistan also faces particular climatic conditions. East Pakistan is faced with alternating floods and droughts. Aridity, paradoxically, combines with waterlogging and salinity to plague agriculture in West Pakistan.

Shortage of Foreign Exchange. Pakistan's heavy investments in capital goods, for the most part, are covered by foreign loans and grants. The United States is by far the largest contributor. Not counting the PL 480 agreement reached in 1961 in the amount of \$622 million, the United States has agreed to lend Pakistan about \$900 million.¹⁰ Although large loans have not yet created an intolerable burden on the balance of payments, they are largely responsible for a chronic and rapidly growing trade deficit.¹¹ The huge expenditures planned for the Third Five-Year Plan will probably aggravate the unfavorable trade situation.

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Constitution and Government. The Republic of Pakistan is administered by a unitary form of central government.

President Ayub Khan promulgated Pakistan's new constitution on 1 March 1962. The constitution emphasizes strong executive control and the Islamic character of the State of Pakistan. A person may not be elected as president, for example, unless he is a Muslim.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 13.

¹¹Ibid., p. 14.

The executive branch is headed by the President and a Council of Ministers. The President's term of office is five years. The constitution provides that members of the Council of Ministers should not be members of the National Assembly, the legislative body.

The Central Legislature consists of the President and one House, the National Assembly of Pakistan. There are 156 members of the National Assembly, one-half from East Pakistan and one-half from West Pakistan.¹² The Assembly continues for a term of five years.

Government at the provincial level in both East and West Pakistan consists of a Governor and provincial legislature. The Governor is subject to directions of the President of Pakistan.

The existing franchise is limited. In 1963, for example, it was based on 80,000 Basic Democrats acting as an electoral college.¹³

POLITICAL PROBLEMS

Domestic Political Problems. Political instability during its formative years and the drive for personal advantage have created many domestic problems. The death of its able leader, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, in 1948, followed by assassination of Prime

¹²The U.S. Military Assistance Institute, op. cit., p. 86.

¹³"Pakistan," Current Notes on International Affairs, Vol. 34, Sep. 1963, p. 13.

Minister Liaquat, in 1951, added to Pakistan's political difficulties.

Ayub Kahn, who assumed control in 1958, maintained martial law until June 1962. Political activity and political parties were banned during the period of martial law. Party activity was resumed after the ban was lifted in June 1962. Since that time several parties have been formed. The Communist Party has been illegal since 1955 and is ineffective.¹⁴

The separation of the nation into two distinct areas has created many controversial issues in Pakistan's internal politics. There are distinct geographic, economic, cultural, linguistic, and ethnic differences which characterize the two sections of the country. The lack of unity arouses apprehension that one section will dominate the other; consequently, there is a constant scramble for favored positions in the central government and civil service.

Additionally, an issue exists over the degree of autonomy to be preserved by linguistic and ethnic groupings within the geographic areas.

International Political Problems. Pakistan must continue to receive massive foreign aid and have peace on its borders if it is to develop. It has been successful in obtaining aid, but not as successful in maintaining peace on its borders.

¹⁴The U.S. Military Assistance Institute, op. cit., p. 90.

Pakistan's foreign relations are dominated by its quarrel with India over Kashmir. Two costly engagements have been fought with India over this issue and the problem is still not solved.

Relations with Afghanistan have been complicated by the controversy over the "Pushtunistan." Pakistan regards the Durand Line, drawn after the second Anglo-Afghan War in 1893, as the established international border, but Afghanistan continues to claim an interest in the people of "Pushtunistan."¹⁵

SOCIAL BACKGROUND

General Character of the Society. The most striking aspect of Pakistan's society is its formation from two separate areas, East and West Pakistan.

East Pakistan, except for the small communities of hill people in the Chittagong Hill tracts, consists of Bengalis, both Muslim and Hindu. Bengalis are shorter and of darker complexion than the average West Pakistani.¹⁶ Bengali is the universal language. East Pakistan is overpopulated, has comparatively little industry, and has a different language, dress, diet, and way of life than other sections of Pakistan.

West Pakistan presents greater ethnic and linguistic diversity than East Pakistan. It is made up of Punjabi, Sinhi, Pathans,

¹⁵US Dept of State, op. cit., p. 7.

¹⁶Alan R. Beals, and others, Field Guide to India: With a Section on Pakistan, p. 48.

Baluchi, and Brahui; the residents of the princely states of Swat, Dir, Chitral and other northern areas. Urdu is the principle language. West Pakistan is more sparsely populated than East Pakistan. West Pakistan, for example, has about 138 persons per square mile against 922 persons per square mile in East Pakistan.¹⁷

The cultural base of Pakistan is formed by Islam, Caste, and the family.¹⁸

Approximately 88 percent of the Pakistanis are Moslems.¹⁹ Islam gives character to the country and its inhabitants. It is the major unifying element of diverse linguist and ethnic groups. Islam provides a guide to all aspects of life and regulates the social behavior of the family and the individual. The emphasis of Islamic doctrine and practice on the community has produced both a sense of identity with Moslem countries and the drive for national expression.²⁰

Caste, although denounced as un-Islamic, is the prevailing structure of power, property, influence and status. Even though Moslems adhere to the principle that all believers are equal in the eyes of God, in practice they do not follow this principle in ordinary social contacts.²¹

¹⁷The U.S. Military Assistance Institute, op. cit., p. 11.

¹⁸Beals, and others, op. cit., pp. 51-53.

¹⁹The U.S. Military Assistance Institute, op. cit., p. 11.

²⁰Ibid., p. 27.

²¹Ibid., p. 28.

The family is the fundamental social and economic unit. And, for the most part, it is the basic source of security.²² The Muslim family of Pakistan is patrilineal, under undisputed control of the eldest male. Sons, both married and unmarried, remain under the command of the father until his death.

SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Ethnic and linguistic differences in East and West Pakistan have a divisive effect on the society. There is a constant struggle among the people to maintain distinctive linguistic and ethnic groupings within each area. This struggle adds to the problems of creating a sense of nationalism in Pakistan.

Islam teaches the Moslems to live with nature and accept weather, monsoons, destruction of crops, floods and famine as the will of God. The consequences that flow from this fatalistic attitude have impeded development.

Caste restricts vertical mobility within the society. In Pakistan, it limits opportunity for the individual in employment, education and marriage. This situation creates apathy among the people and indifference towards social reform programs.

Family interests take precedence over community interests. Social custom requires family solidarity, while lack of opportunity to branch away from the family limits economic opportunity and perpetuates economic need.

²²Ibid., p. 29.

MILITARY BACKGROUND

The Beginning of the Modern Pakistan Armed Forces.

Pakistan's armed forces had their beginning in the old British Indian armed forces. Many of the units have a history dating back over two centuries, and were the pride of the old British Indian Forces. Its armed forces were born when the British Indian Army was divided into the Pakistan Army and Indian Army in 1947. The units which had a majority of Moslems were assigned to the Pakistan Army.²³

Top Control and Overall Strength. As in the United States, the President of Pakistan is the titular commander of the Armed Forces. Unlike the United States, the President also holds the Portfolio of Minister of Defense. Pakistan's Defense Ministry, headed by the Secretary of Defense, is a relatively small organization. The individual services are allowed a large degree of autonomy in their respective fields.

The uniformed services consist of an army, navy, and air force. Total strength of the armed forces is about 248,000.²⁴ The defense budget for 1964-65 has been estimated at \$269 million.²⁵

The Army. The transition from the old British Indian Army to the Pakistan Army was completed in January 1951 when General Sir

²³Ibid., p. 14.

²⁴The Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance; 1964-65, WC2, Nov. 1964, p. 26.

²⁵Ibid.

Douglas Gracey turned over command to the Army's first Pakistani Commander-in-Chief, General Ayub Khan.

Recruitment and training parallels British concepts while the organization of tactical units and formations somewhat parallels United States Army organizational concepts.

The Army consists of about 230,000 regular troops organized into eight divisions and equipped with M-47 tanks.²⁶ In addition to the regular army, 250,000 lightly armed militia and about 30,000 Azad Kashmir may be called upon in an emergency.²⁷

Morale in the Pakistan Army is generally excellent. The strong influence of Islam, and the fact that the army is made up entirely of volunteer forces are major contributors to this high morale.

The Navy. The Pakistan Navy is small but compact. Its estimated personnel strength is about 7,700.²⁸ Its major ships include one light cruiser, five destroyers, two ASW frigates, eight minesweepers and 10 other miscellaneous ships.²⁹ British tradition is still strong in the Pakistan Navy, but is waning since many personnel have received training in the United States.

The Air Force. The Air Force came into being in 1947 when two squadrons of the former Royal Indian Air Force together with

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid.

about 65 pilots, 1900 airmen, and 200 officers were allotted to Pakistan.³⁰

Today, it is estimated that the Air Force strength is between 17,000 and 25,000 personnel and 200 aircraft, including one F-104 squadron.³¹

MILITARY PROBLEMS

One of Pakistan's most pressing military problems is that industry is unable to provide major items of equipment for the armed forces. Its military posture is further weakened by an inadequate military logistical system. Most major items of equipment and many other critical items of support are obtained from foreign sources, principally the United States. When these sources were cut off during the recent Pakistani-Indian conflict, this glaring deficiency was keenly felt by the Pakistani government.

Another significant problem is that the number of volunteers who are qualified for technical training is inadequate to meet requirements.

The formation of Pakistan into two geographical areas, separated by about 1200 miles of Indian territory, presents the armed forces with a strategic problem of major importance. The many problems associated with this fact of geography are apparent.

³⁰The U.S. Military Assistance Institute, op. cit., p. 153.

³¹The Institute for Strategic Studies, op. cit., p. 26.

CHAPTER 4

SIGNIFICANT TRENDS IN ACTIONS BY COMMUNIST CHINA IN SOUTHERN ASIA

FACTORS INFLUENCING COMMUNIST CHINA'S ACTIONS

The Tradition of the Middle Kingdom. One of the keys to an understanding of the basic motivations of Red China's actions in Southern Asia is rooted deep in Chinese history. The present government inherited a tradition that considered China as the center of the world. During the Middle Kingdom era, China was the dominant power in Asia. This tradition may motivate Peking's drive for hegemony in the Far East. It may also motivate the government's drive to regain territory that once belonged to the mighty Chinese Empire.

Political Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung. In trying to discover the basic motivations of Peking's foreign policy, the political thoughts of Mao must be considered. Mao's political thoughts have had a profound affect on Communist China's relations with its neighbors.

The ideological commitment of Mao calls for support to other Asian Communist movements and in a very real sense, shapes the regime's objectives.¹

Mao's great accomplishment has been to change Marxism from a European to an Asiatic form.² Conditions in Southern Asia are

¹Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb, pp. 10-14.

²Statement of Liu Shao-chi made to Anna Louise Strong in 1946 as quoted by Stuart R. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, p. 56.

similar to those in Red China; therefore, his innovations have influenced all nations in this area.

Mao's image of the world leads Red China's regime to accept violence as a legitimate tool of policy and to view domestic politics in other countries as a manifestation of class struggle.³ For this reason, it is probable that military force will be at the base of Peking's efforts to implement its foreign policy objectives in Southern Asia. In this connection, it is important to remember Mao's often quoted statement that, "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."⁴

It would be a mistake, however, to leave the reader with the impression that Mao views the reckless use of military force as a model for gaining hegemony in Asia. Apparently a sharp distinction is made between doctrines on the inevitability and desirability of employing military force. The fact that this distinction is made is demonstrated by Red China's attitude toward a direct military confrontation with the United States. Since assuming power, Peking has resorted to military force only in areas which have been traditionally part of China or whenever it was believed that, as in the case of Korea, its own territory was endangered. An exception to this rule may be India. And, in this case, the military objective was obviously limited. Peking's use of force

³Halperin, op. cit., p. 10.

⁴Mao Tse-tung, as quoted by Samuel B. Griffith, Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare, p. 12.

has been marked by its desire to pursue objectives as vigorously as possible short of provoking an American attack on the Chinese mainland.

Domestic Policy. Another key to an understanding of the basic motivations of Red China's foreign policy is the impact of domestic policy on foreign policy. Domestic policy appears to have influenced Peking's foreign policy.

Communist China's leaders, by 1956, had good cause to view its future with optimism. The gains of the revolution had been consolidated and a strong central state established. Results of the First Five-Year Plan were highly encouraging. China had emerged as leader of the Afro-Asian world as a result of Chou En-lai's skillful diplomacy at the twenty-nine nation Bandung Conference in April, 1955.⁵

Success at home and abroad led the Party leaders to liberalize the control apparatus of the state. In implementing its liberalization program the Communist Party solicited open criticism from the people. The object of the liberalization program, in Communist jargon, was to rectify, in the Party members and cadres, the three-fold evil of "bureaucratism," "sectarianism" and "subjectivism."⁶ The liberalization program became popularly known as the "Hundred Flowers" movement. The results of this

⁵Vidya Prakash Dutt, China's Foreign Policy; 1958-62, pp. 2-3.

⁶Jen-min Jih-pao, 1 Apr. 1957, as quoted by Dutt, op. cit., p. 10.

experiment in liberalization are well known. Criticism of the Party became so widespread and vicious that a vigorous program had to be launched by the government to suppress the "intellectual revolt." In summing up the lessons learned from the experiment, Mao seems to have concluded that, in its present state of development, Red China could not afford to relax; bourgeois would always remain bourgeois and could not be trusted.⁷

Peking's experience with "rightist" forces in China proper was duplicated in the Tibetan revolt of 1958-1959. Apparently, this experience convinced government leaders that Communist forces outside Communist China could gain power only through violent and protracted struggles.⁸

Relations Between the United States and Communist China.

Relations between the United States and Communist China greatly influence Peking's actions in Southern Asia. It is generally accepted that hostility between these two power centers is one of the major causes for acute tension in the Far East.

The present day confrontation between the United States and Red China had its beginning in the Chinese civil war. United States support of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang sowed the seeds of distrust, suspicion, and Communist hostility towards the United States.

⁷Ibid., pp. 17-18.

⁸Ibid., p. 19.

The Korean war ended the hope of many western observers of a gradual normalization of relations in the near future between Red China and the United States. As a result of the Korean War the United States embarked on a policy of containment of Communist China, SEATO being a product of this effort. Communist China worked diligently to break the circle of containment.

For a brief period following the Bandung Conference in 1955, there was hope in some quarters that a rapprochement between the United States and Communist China might be effected. At the Bandung Conference, members of the Afro-Asian block, some close friends of the United States, persuaded Chou En-lai to open negotiations with the United States.⁹ Talks began, at the ambassadorial level, in Warsaw on 1 August 1955 to relax tension and solve outstanding problems between the two countries. Little progress was made and the talks ended in complete failure in 1958.¹⁰ Apparently, because of failure of the talks, Peking concluded that there was no hope of a peaceful settlement with the United States. After the talks had failed, Peking proclaimed that the only language the U.S. imperialists understood was force.¹¹

Since 1958 relations between the United States and Red China have continued to deteriorate. New sources of tension have continued to spring up to exacerbate relations between the two

⁹Ibid., p. 22.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 24.

¹¹Jen-min Jih-pao, 20 Jul. 1958, as quoted by Dutt, op. cit., p. 24.

countries. To mention a few: The Taiwan Straits crisis in 1958; the trouble in Laos; the U.S. attitude toward the revolt in Tibet in 1959; the signing of the U.S.-Japanese Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in 1960; the actions of the United States during the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962; and the present day confrontation in Vietnam and Southern Asia.

One of the basic assumptions of current Communist Chinese foreign policy appears to be total and unremitting hostility towards the United States. The thrust of this hostility derives its energy in large part from ideological and nationalistic sources as well as from the frustrations of a proud and energetic people striving to regain great power status for its nation.

In summary, Sino-U.S. relations have become a key factor in China's relations with countries in Southern Asia.

PEKING CHANGES ITS FOREIGN POLICY

In its early years as a nation, Peking's main efforts were directed towards consolidation of internal power and rebuilding its economy. Red China's relations with its neighbors were rigid and inflexible. Generally, Soviet policies in the area were continued.¹² Gradually, a more realistic and flexible foreign policy was adopted. Friendly relations were established with many of the newly emerging nations of Asia, irrespective of their political and economic systems.

¹²Dutt, op. cit., p. 147.

During the period 1952-57, Peking made significant gains in Asia by following moderate and flexible policies. At Bandung in 1955, for example, Chou En-lai succeeded in gaining substantial political support for Red China among the newly emerging nations of Africa and Asia. However, by 1958, a sudden shift in Communist Chinese foreign policy was discernible.¹³

In searching for the causes of this abrupt change in foreign policy, several factors are worth noting. Peking had failed to reach a rapprochement with the United States during the Warsaw talks. The political liberalization experiment inside Red China had failed. And, finally, Peking had reduced the effectiveness of the encirclement policy of the United States. It appears that these factors combined to convince Communist China that a hard and inflexible approach was the best method of achieving its political and diplomatic goals.¹⁴

By 1960 it was apparent to Peking that its newly adopted militant policy was isolating China in international affairs. It had border disputes with Burma and Nepal. Relations with India, Indonesia and the UAR were strained.¹⁵ Chou En-lai attempted to place the blame for failures in foreign relations on forces outside Red China. He accused imperialists, headed by the United States, of conducting a vicious anti-Chinese wave to prevent the

¹³Ibid., p. 152.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 153.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 166.

spread of Peking's influence and isolate China in international affairs.¹⁶

The Communist leaders, being pragmatists, realized that Red China's policies would have to be readjusted. Practical steps were taken to restore friendly relations with its neighbors. It is interesting to note that while Peking made some adjustments in policy, it did not renounce its long run strategy of "protracted struggle" against the West and support of the international Communist movement.

PEKING MAKES NEW FRIENDS IN SOUTHERN ASIA

Burma. Burma was the first country to benefit from Peking's readjustment of policy. At the invitation of Communist China, Burma's Prime Minister arrived in Peking on 28 January 1960. The two countries signed the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression, and the Agreement on the Boundary Question.¹⁷ It is important to cite significant features of the Treaties since it set the pattern for similar treaties with other nations of Southern Asia.

Communist China magnanimously accepted, with minor exceptions, Burma's border claims which followed the McMahon Line.¹⁸ Both

¹⁶"Report to the Second Session of the Second National People's Congress, 10 April," Peking Review, No. 15, 12 Apr. 1960, as quoted by Dutt, op. cit., pp. 167-168.

¹⁷Dutt, op. cit., p. 170.

¹⁸Ibid.

countries pledged not to take part in any military alliance against the other Party.¹⁹ After the initial agreement, Peking drew Burma closer to Communist China with trade agreements and an assistance program.

At first glance, it appeared to other countries in Southern Asia that the agreements were highly beneficial to Burma. The border settlement was in Burma's favor, and the assistance program was generous. It was not readily apparent to these countries that Burma's external relations were, in reality, taken over by Red China. For example, Peking could unilaterally decide whether an alliance made by Burma was hostile to Red China.

Communist China's actions in Burma demonstrated that Peking's new program of "peaceful coexistence" was brilliantly conceived and easily implemented. It soon became obvious that it was destined to reap large benefits for Communist China in Southern Asia.

Nepal. Nepal's rapprochement with Red China followed the general pattern set in Burma. Nepal's Prime Minister arrived in Peking in March 1960, again at the invitation of Communist China, and signed a boundary agreement as well as an economic aid agreement.²⁰ Peking was generous in its dealings with Nepal.

¹⁹Peking Review, No. 5, 2 Feb. 1960, p. 13, as quoted by Dutt, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

²⁰Dutt, *op. cit.*, pp. 178-179.

After King Mahendra took over the government, a new border agreement was signed in October 1961 on the basis of the traditional customary boundary.²¹ An agreement was also concluded for the construction of a highway between Tibet and Kathmandu. The latter agreement was an ominous threat to India.

As in the case of Burma, the agreements tied Nepal to Red China politically and economically. In Nepal, however, Peking went one step further and began active participation in the internal affairs of Nepal. Red China unabashedly supported the monarchy rather than revolutionary elements in the country. It was apparent that Peking was openly attempting to eliminate Indian influence in Nepal.

Cambodia. Peking's relations with Cambodia followed a pattern adopted later in Burma and Nepal. The pattern included both political support and economic diplomacy.²² In response to an invitation received at the Bandung Conference, Prince Sihanouk visited Peking in April 1956.²³ He was given a warm welcome and a substantial sum of money for plant construction in Cambodia. Prince Sihanouk again visited Peking in August 1958 and received promises of support from Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai for his foreign policy of "peace and neutrality."²⁴ Since that time Cambodia has developed closer relations with Communist China.

²¹Peking Review, No. 41, 13 Oct. 1961, pp. 11-12, as quoted by Dutt, op. cit., p. 183.

²²Dutt, op. cit., p. 185.

²³Ibid., p. 186.

²⁴Ibid., p. 187.

India. Prior to 1955, India enjoyed good relations with Red China. On 29 April 1954, for example, Communist China and India signed an agreement on Trade and Intercourse and the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence.²⁵ There were diplomatic exchanges over minor boundary issues in 1954 and further exchanges beginning in 1955.²⁶

After 1955, however, the expansion of Communist China's influence brought Peking into conflict with India. This was demonstrated by India's opposition to Peking's proposals for a second Afro-Asian Conference.²⁷ At the same time, Russia's aid to India caused Red China to reappraise its policy towards India.²⁸ In 1958 tension between the two countries increased as the border issue became more serious. Relations were further strained when India openly sympathized with the revolution in Tibet in 1959. India's decision to grant asylum to the Dalai Lama added more fuel to the flames.²⁹

On 8 September, Peking laid claim to 12,000 square miles in the Ladakh region and 30,000 square miles in the McMahon line area.³⁰ At the same time, Peking refused to accept the McMahon Line and refused to discuss the boundaries between China and Bhutan and between China and Sikkim.³¹

²⁵Ibid., pp. 197-198.

²⁶R. G. Boyd, Communist China's Foreign Policy, p. 28.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid., p. 30.

³⁰Dutt, op. cit., pp. 201-202.

³¹Ibid., pp. 204-205.

Prime Minister Nehru and Prime Minister Chou En-lai met in Delhi on 19 April 1960 in an effort to settle the border question, but a solution to the problem was not found.³² It has been reported by some observers that Chou En-lai visited New Delhi to suggest a barter. China would accommodate India along the North-east Frontier Area sector, staying behind the McMahon Line, if India would be willing to accommodate China in Ladakh.³³ If this is true, it indicates the importance China ascribed to the Tibet-Sinkiang highway in Ladakh. The Tibet-Sinkiang highway has apparently assumed great significance as a means of influence and control not merely of Tibet and Sinkiang, but in the whole Central Asian region.³⁴

The struggle between India and Communist China widened. In October 1962, Red China launched a large scale attack against Indian positions in the eastern and western sectors of the frontier. In the ensuing battle, a humiliating defeat was inflicted on the Indian forces. On 21 November 1962, Peking voluntarily halted the advance of its troops and withdrew its forces behind the McMahon Line in the eastern sector and the line of actual control in November 1959 in the western sector.³⁵

At the initiative of Ceylon, Ghana, the UAR, Ceylon, Burma and Cambodia formulated a set of proposals, popularly known as

³²Ibid., pp. 206-207.

³³Werner Levi, "The Sino-Indian Border War," Current History, Vol. 45, Sep. 1963, p. 139.

³⁴Ibid., p. 142.

³⁵Dutt, op. cit., p. 222.

the Colombo Proposals, for peaceful settlement of the border conflict. The Indian government accepted the proposals, but Peking would accept the proposals only with reservations.³⁶

Although Peking brought its military attack on India to a halt, its political attack has been continued with relentless vigor. In September 1965, for example, Red China warned India that the border question was far from being closed. It accused India of occupying large areas of Chinese territory in the eastern, middle and western sectors of the Sino-Indian border.³⁷ India has continued to reject Peking's border claims.

In September 1965 Peking reiterated support of Pakistan in the hostilities with India over Kashmir and massed troops along the border.³⁸

It appears that a vast political confrontation is taking place between Red China and India and the border issue is being used by Peking to keep the confrontation alive.

Pakistan. Before 1954, relations between Peking and China were not good. Peking openly encouraged revolutionary action by the Communist parties in Southern Asia. This was a continuation of the policy called for by the Cominform in 1947.³⁹ However, by

³⁶Ibid., p. 225.

³⁷"Running Away is All Right, But Denial Won't Do," Peking Review, Vol. 40, 1 Oct. 1965, pp. 16-17.

³⁸"China Gives India an Ultimatum," The Washington Post, 17 Sep. 1965, pp. A1-A8.

³⁹Boyd, op. cit., p. 7.

1954 Peking had embarked on its first "peaceful coexistence" plan and relations with Pakistan began to improve.

At Bandung, the Pakistani Prime Minister accepted an invitation to visit China. During the visit that followed, Sino-Pakistani relations improved.⁴⁰

Peking's attitude towards Pakistan began to stiffen in 1958. During the early years of Ayub's Presidency, Peking was hostile toward Pakistan. It denounced Pakistan's bilateral military agreement with the United States and claimed that the Pakistani government was diametrically opposed to the interest of peace in Asia and to the national interests of Pakistan; however, at that time, Peking did not make a public commitment regarding Kashmir.⁴¹

As relations between Communist China and India deteriorated, relations between Pakistan and Peking became more cordial. In May 1962, Rawalpindi and Peking announced their decision to negotiate a border settlement.⁴² A boundary and aid agreement was signed in March 1963.⁴³ Since 1963, relations between Pakistan and Communist China have been cordial, but there have been reports that Pakistan is avoiding close ties with Peking.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 29.

⁴¹Jen-min Jih-pao, Observer, 23 Jul. 1959, Peking Review, No. 30, 38 Jul. 1950, pp. 18-19, as quoted by Dutt, op. cit., p. 230.

⁴²Dutt, op. cit., p. 232.

⁴³Ibid.

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⁴²Dutt, op. cit., p. 232.

⁴³Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMMUNIST CHINA

INDIA

Diversion of Resources From Development Programs. It is generally agreed that, if India is to develop, it must have peace on its borders.

Red China's military confrontation with India has compelled the Indian government to divert resources urgently needed for economic development to military outlays directed at countering Peking's armies on the disputed Himalayan frontier.

Communist China also encouraged and backed Pakistan in the recent Pakistani-Indian war over Kashmir. As a result of the war with Pakistan, the Indian economy, already plagued by food shortages and inflation, was further disrupted. The fourth Five-Year Development Plan, scheduled to begin in April 1966, has been set aside.¹

A shortage of skilled management and supervisory personnel constitutes one of the most critical bottlenecks in India's development program. Because of the military confrontation with Red China and Pakistan, many critical management and supervisory personnel have been diverted from development programs to national defense programs.

¹Seymour Topping, "Turmoil Retards Growth," New York Times, 24 Jan. 1966, p. C37-38.

In summary, Red China's action on the Himalayan frontier has compounded India's development problems by requiring the diversion of critical human and material resources from development programs to military programs.

Internal Dissension. One of the most serious threats to India's continued viability as a nation lies in the growth of internal dissension.

It is increasingly common for individuals and groups to use democracy as a scapegoat for India's problems. Although Red China's attacks on the Himalayan border temporarily united the people, another humiliating defeat would probably swell the ranks of those who have lost confidence in democracy as a means of achieving development in India. The Communist Party in India numbered over 200,000 in 1965.² The Chinese revolutionary model has had a tremendous influence upon the thinking and activity of the Indian Communist leaders. As a result of this influence, the Communist Party split into left and right factions in 1964.³ Except in Kerala, where it has an effective strength of about 40 percent, the split in the party has reduced the Communist Party to an ineffective force.⁴ However, the trend of communism in India is toward national communism rather than full-fledged internationalism.⁵ This trend may enable the Communist party to become more effective in the future.

²Robert A. Scalapino, ed., The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals and Achievements, p. 30.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

Another serious threat to India's viability as a nation lies in the potential loss of self-confidence within the political leadership. Indian leadership appears unable to control regional and provincial strife. In the long run, success in India's Development Plans will do much to unify the people and impart confidence in the political leadership. But, India must have peace on its borders to achieve success in its Development Plans. It is apparent that Peking intends to maintain discord on the Sino-Indian border.

Foreign Relations. Foreign relations impact on the growth and security of a nation. The dominant themes in India's foreign relations have been world peace and nonalignment. By following these themes, India gained considerable prestige among the non-aligned nations of the world. India's rise to a position of leadership among the nonaligned nations of the world brought India into conflict with Communist China. Peking, for ideological and nationalistic reasons, appears determined to eliminate India as a competitor for leadership of Southern Asia and the nonaligned world. Conflict on the Sino-Indian border offered Peking the opportunity of weakening India as a competitor without endangering its national security. Politically, Red China capitalized on the situation by accusing India of abandoning its position of neutrality and adopting a policy of aggression. To add credibility to the charge, Peking cited the manner in which it had arrived at peaceful border settlements with Burma, Nepal, and Pakistan. It

has repeatedly blamed the Sino-Indian border conflict on Indian intransigence. The fact that only two of 55 Afro-Asian nations spontaneously offered to support India's position during the Sino-Indian conflict attests to the effectiveness of Communist China's political actions against India.⁶

PAKISTAN

Diversion of Resources from Development Programs. It is generally agreed that, if Pakistan is to develop, it must have peace on its borders.

Peking has not forced Pakistan to divert its resources from development to military programs. Pakistan's costly war with India cannot be attributed to Peking's efforts to destroy Pakistan's economy. The fact that Peking supports Pakistan's position in the dispute over Kashmir must be viewed in the larger context of the Sino-Indian confrontation.

Peking had a "golden" opportunity to draw Pakistan into a military confrontation over demarkation of the border between Pakistan and Communist China. However, Peking, in marked contrast to its actions toward India, negotiated a border settlement with Pakistan. It is true that Pakistan did not receive the same generous treatment as Burma and Nepal, but it is also true that Pakistan did not offer the same degree of cooperation with Peking's

⁶Werner Levi, "The Sino-Indian Border War," Current History, Sep. 1963, p. 141.

program of "peaceful coexistence" as Burma and Nepal. In this connection, it should be remembered that Pakistan is a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).⁷

Peking has not taken advantage of the controversy between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the "Pushtunistan." This appears to be consistent with Peking's other actions toward Pakistan at the present time. However, Peking may well use this dispute in the future to force Pakistan into closer ties with Communist China.

Internal Dissension. One of Pakistan's most serious problems is its lack of political and cultural unity. This problem is compounded by the geographical separation of East and West Pakistan. There is ample opportunity for Peking to exploit the weaknesses inherent in this situation. At the present time, however, there are no signs that Peking is taking advantage of this situation.

Foreign Relations. Although there is an affinity between Pakistan and other Moslem nations, Peking apparently does not consider Pakistan as a competitor for leadership in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, Pakistan is a deadly enemy of Peking's chief competitor in Southern Asia, India.

In summary, relations between Pakistan and Peking are cordial. This is most interesting since their political and economic

⁷US Dept of State, Background Notes: Pakistan, Aug. 1964, p. 7.

philosophies are diametrically opposed. An attempt to isolate the nationalistic and ideological factors that motivate this relationship would probably not be fruitful. The important factor in this relationship is that it demonstrates the flexibility of Peking's foreign policy.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

APPARENT OBJECTIVES OF COMMUNIST CHINA TOWARD INDIA

Short Run Objectives. In the short run Peking appears to have four major objectives in India: (1) to humiliate India, fostering the impression that the Indian model is not a suitable alternative to communism and creating a role for Communist China as the principal power in Asia; (2) to isolate India, preventing the formation of a block of nations in Southern Asia outside Communist China's sphere of influence; (3) to prevent India from building a strong viable nation that is capable of challenging Communist China's hegemony in Asia, and (4) to insure control over the Aksai Chin area to protect the Tibet Sinkiang Highway.

Long Run Objective. In the long run, Peking appears to have the objective of obtaining a Communist government in India responsive to Peking's interests in the world.

APPARENT STRATEGY OF COMMUNIST CHINA TOWARD INDIA

It appears that, to accomplish its objectives in India, Peking has adopted a strategy of protracted struggle through indirect aggression.

The strategy is being implemented by: (1) unrelenting and vigorous hostility towards the West in general and the United States in particular; (2) guiding and supporting the struggle

of the Communist movements within India; and (3) threats of massive military attacks against India.

The strategy is derived from orthodox Communist doctrine as modified by Mao Tse-tung. It is based on a belief in the ultimate success of persistent, cautious and flexible aggression against target countries who are considered to lack the will and courage to carry on prolonged battle. Protracted struggle through indirect aggression will at times be limited and disguised and at other times open and bellicose, but in either case it will always be retractable according to the reaction of the West and in particular the United States. Unless its borders or territories are threatened, Peking will avoid becoming directly involved in a war with the United States.

APPARENT OBJECTIVES OF COMMUNIST CHINA TOWARD PAKISTAN

Short Run Objective. In the short run, Peking appears to have one major objective in Pakistan: to maintain a government in Pakistan responsive to Peking's interests in Asia.


Long Run Objective. In the long run, Peking appears to have the objective of obtaining a Communist government in Pakistan responsive to Peking's interests in the world.

APPARENT STRATEGY OF COMMUNIST CHINA TOWARD PAKISTAN

It appears that, to accomplish its objectives in Pakistan, Peking has adopted a strategy of "peaceful coexistence."

The strategy is being implemented by: (1) projecting hostility towards the West, but at the same time giving the impression that Peking desires to avoid armed conflict with the West; (2) formal pledges of Peking's dedication to "peaceful coexistence," but with implications that Pakistan may enjoy security and Red China's goodwill only if it avoids cooperation with the West.

The strategy of "peaceful coexistence" combines implicit threats with the promise to respect the territorial integrity and political independence. The threats are designed to discourage Pakistan from continuing its alignment with the West. Initially, Pakistan probably has been asked to simply remain neutral, but once committed to neutrality it will be drawn deeper into Communist China's sphere of influence.



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